Since the early 1990s the European Union has struggled to increase integration in the sovereignty sensitive areas of justice and home affairs and foreign policy. The aim of this paper is to enhance our understanding of what patterns of cooperation have been established between the member states, and why. I do so by analysing the case of short-stay visa policy. Visas are a corner stone of EU's border control, regulating access to the Union's area of freedom, security and justice. It is moreover an instrument used in foreign and diplomatic relations. As a field where the member states' cooperation is particularly intense it is an 'extreme case' well-suited for drawing out empirical patterns and developing theoretical concepts. The paper is based on a network analytical approach and a new dataset of all the EU/Schengen member states' mutual consular visa assistance agreements. This I use to document the extent and pattern of cooperation from 2005 to 2010. I show that the member states rely intensively on each other's consular services. They mainly share sovereignty in four distinct regional clusters -a Nordic, Benelux, Southern European and an emerging Central Eastern. France and Germany are at the centre of the network. To explain this structure of cooperation I discuss the relative merits of realist, liberal intergovernmentalist and constructivist approaches. I show how they each identify important dynamics but emphasise the relative merits of a constructivist perspective. I put forward a new concept of 'regional imagined communities' which explains cooperation by the existence of shared identities owing to regional commonalities in language and state-building histories. I argue that the concept improves our understanding of European integration in visa policy, and suggest it might hold wider potential for explaining dynamics of collaboration in other sovereignty sensitive policy areas.
Introduction
From the beginning of the 1990s and onwards the European Union has established still closer cooperation in the controversial areas of justice and home affairs and foreign policy (Lavenex & W. Wallace 2005; Howorth 2001 ).
Yet because of the sovereignty-sensitive character of the policy fields integration has in both cases stopped short of full supranational and hierarchical governance (Lavenex 2009: 256f) . Cooperation has instead primarily been marked by "intensive transgovernmentalism" (Lavenex 2010 only play a minor role (H. Wallace 2010: 92f) .2 Pin-pointing the overall importance of state governments existing research has, however, not investigated in detail the constraints and structures in their mutual interaction.3 In this paper I aim to 1 Wallace (2010) classifies intensive transgovernmentalism as one policy-making mode alongside four other used in the EU: the classical community method, the EU regulatory mode, the EU distributional mode and policy coordination. Tömmel (2009) operates with four types of European governance: hierarchical, negotiation, competition and cooperation. In her framework intensive transgovernmentalism could be seen as a hybrid of negotiation and cooperation. 2 Transgovernmentalism can also be defined as a situation where actors from diverse ministries and levels of government cooperate directly with their counterparts in other European states without explicit national coordination and control from for example foreign ministries (Mérand, Hofmann & Irondelle 2010 ; see also Bigo 2000; Lavenex 2009: 258) . 3 An exception to this trend has been the general observation that cooperation is limited by the need for a converging interest of all members and that as a result political agreements reached tends to reflect the lowest common denominator (Lavenex 2009: 266). contribute to the existing literature by investigating what patterns of cooperation has been established between the member states in a particular sovereignty sensitive policy area, and why.
The case I study is European consular cooperation abroad in visa matters. Visas grant or deny individuals legal access to state territories (Guild 2009: 118f) .
Establishing and enforcing visa restrictions are matters of diplomacy and foreign relations, as well as central instruments in relation to internal security and the control of illegal migration (Martenczuk 2009) . It is thus a case on both interior and foreign policy cooperation. Visas are, additionally, an example of a sovereignty-sensitive policy area where the member states have established especially strong cooperation (Lavenex & Ucarer 2002: 6) .4 It is thereby an 'extreme case' (Flyvbjerg 1991: 150) and as such able to bring out empirical patterns otherwise not easily identifiable. In that way it provides a good basis for theoretical development (George & Bennett 2005: 75) .
Based on a new, comprehensive and original dataset of consular visa cooperation agreements and a network analytical method I advance two empirical arguments and one theoretical:
Firstly, the EU-states cooperate intensively abroad in visa matters. Outside Europe, the average Schengen member has independent visa-issuing consular representation in about 50 countries, relies on cooperative agreements in 50 and is not represented in 70 states.
Secondly, the structure of the cooperation largely follows regional clusters within Europe. The Nordic countries, Benelux, Southern Europe and to some extent also the new Central and Eastern member states all cooperate internally. France and Germany ties the clusters together as the centre of the network. Thus, the Schengen states mainly cooperate in the visa entry control process within tight regional circles.
Thirdly, while both realism and liberal intergovernmentalism are able to explain important parts of the empirical pattern, constructivism on the whole goes furthest in accounting for the network structure (Waltz 1979; Moravcsik 1993; Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein 1996) . In particular, I put forward a concept of 'regional imagined communities' (cf. Anderson 1991) as a central factor in explaining the cooperation.
This notion, I suggest, could have a wider analytical potential as a tool for understanding integration in other sovereignty-sensitive areas.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. I start out by presenting the case and existing research on visa cooperation abroad. Then the data and methods used are presented. I subsequently conduct the empirical analysis and discuss three theoretical explanations of the patterns of cooperation identified. Finally, I conclude and set out the wider implications of the findings.
EU visa policy cooperation
Today, with the dismantling of almost all internal borders in Europe considerable political and administrative resources are invested in attempts to strengthen and harmonise the control of the EU's external border (Thielemann & Sasse 2005 ). Shortstay visas are a centre-piece of these efforts (Bigo & Guild 2005) . For the nationals of the approximately 130 countries currently on EU's common visa list the first and main check of their eligibility to enter the EU occurs at consulates abroad during the application procedure (Guild 2003) . Visas thus aim to ensure that travellers are prescreened before they arrive at the territorial border.
Visa requirements also play a role in diplomatic relations (Martenczuk 2009; Stringer 2004 ). Travel restrictions can be imposed on some third countries and not others as part of a differentiation between allies and adversaries. They are used as a 'carrot' and 'stick' and can be imposed or lifted as a concession to another partner or to signal a bi-lateral worsening or improvement of relations. As part of the EU enlargement process, for example, visa restrictions have been gradually liberalized for most of the countries in the Balkans (Trauner 2009: 75-77) .
The EU has attempted to encourage different forms of administrative cooperation in the visa-issuing process to ensure a uniform application of the shared visa legislation. The European Commission has promoted the idea of joint application processing centres (see for example Com 2007) . The common rules also encourage local consular officials to meet and exchange data. Finally, a member state can make a bilateral agreement transferring fully or partly the visa-issuing process in a specific country or city to another Schengen member represented at the location (OJEU 2009).
These options for cooperation abroad have been partially analysed both within the justice and home affairs and the foreign policy literature.
The justice and home affairs literature has in general shown considerable interest in visas and consular cooperation abroad (cf. Bigo & Guild 2005; Guild 2003; Pijpers & van der Velde 2007) . It has, however, mainly focused on the overall legal framework and policy documents. Systematic empirical studies of the practice of consular visa cooperation have not been carried out within this literature.
Foreign policy analysts have largely focused on the creation of institutional structures of cooperation in Brussels, or on changes in the central offices of national foreign ministries as a result of EU integration (Carlsnaes, Sjursen & White 2004) . A few authors have also devoted some attention to European diplomatic and consular networks abroad. Rijks and Whitman (2007: 39-41) analyse overall aspects of European diplomatic cooperation. They note that this concept is somewhat vague and propose a distinction between sharing "facilities" (buildings, support staff) and "capabilities" (diplomatic tasks, consular services). They state that the sharing of facilities and capabilities have not yet been much of a success. The attempts to construct joint visa application centres have not gained particular momentum. Fernandez (2006) uses an Europeanization framework to analyse local consular cooperation and investigate how and to what extent the member states regularly meet and exchange information. Based primarily on an analysis of EU evaluation reports and policy documents she concludes that results have been "mixed" (Fernández 2006: 16f) . On the one hand there has been an incorporation of EU rules and norms in local practices. But, on the other hand, resistance and lack of convergence remains due to the sensitivity of the area.
In sum, the member states have over the years harmonized overall approaches in the area of visas, a policy central to both foreign relations and internal security and migration control. Both the justice and home affairs and the foreign policy literature have taken an interest in the consular cooperation abroad in visa matters. The few analyses conducted so far indicates, however, that at this administrative level cooperation remains more limited. In the next section I set out the data and methods I utilize to contribute to our existing knowledge of European consular cooperation abroad in visa matters.
Data and methods
I measure the structure and extent of cooperation abroad using a new dataset covering the bilateral visa representation agreements entered into by the member states. I do not investigate meetings and exchange of data between officials in third countries ('local consular cooperation') or the establishment of joint embassy compounds ('shared visa application centres').
The rules governing the bilateral agreements are set out in the common visa code (OJEU 2009).5 The specific form of cooperation can vary within a given bilateral agreement. There can, for example, be rules on costs-distribution and consultation 5 The 2009 visa code replaced, with minor changes, the previous regulations about bilateral agreements specified in the so-called Common Consular Instructions (CCI). This document laid out the rules and norms for the entire visa issuing process (OJEU 2002) . The main difference between the old and the new regulations were the introduction of somewhat more detailed and explicit requirements about how the agreements should be legally formulated. These were based on notifications by the member states of the cities abroad in which they had independent representation or relied on a visa-issuing agreement.
I have coded six versions of the consolidated overviews at yearly intervals starting in October 2004 and ending in April 2010 (Council 2004 (Council , 2005 (Council , 2006 (Council , 2007 (Council , 2008 (Council , 2010b . The core of the dataset is two tables. The first contains a list of all the member states' own visa-issuing representations abroad per country, city and year. The raw data contains footnotes about the extent of consular services -if for example visas are solely issued to diplomatic personnel. I have only used a simple coding of whether or not a country has a visa facility at the location. For all six years this yields 9.472 observations. The second table contains a list of each cooperative agreement between 6 According to article 53(a) of the new visa code the member state must now inform the Commission of the existence of bilateral agreements, which is then obliged to publish the overview of agreements (OJEU 2009 , cf. Council 2010a two member states per city, country and year. The total count of agreements is 6.852.
If a cooperation agreement ended during a year, I included it if it lasted for more than half of the year in question.
The main method I utilize to investigate the data is network analysis (Wasserman & Faust 1994; Scott 2000) . This technique is especially well-suited for identifying and clarifying the structure of relationship between actors by modelling their mutual contact. The analytical unit in network analysis is pairs of actors -for example two countries and the amount of contact between them. For the purpose of the network analysis I thus recoded the data into bilateral pairs of member states. For each year I measured the total number of agreements between them. This measure is directional (Wasserman & Faust 1994: 273 A key consideration in the construction of the graphs is to what extent all relations between actors should be modelled or only significant or strong ties. This is an important issue because a threshold makes it possible to better identify patterns, and is thus also highly important for the conclusions drawn. I have consistently used the mean number of agreements between any two member states as the cut-off point for all years. This ensures the reliability of the analysis. The threshold for inclusion is thereby in practice between seven to nine agreements. The Schengen-members on average has about 50 mutual cooperative agreements. A bilateral relation covering less than seven to nine agreements would thus seem minor. The threshold therefore also appears valid as it ensures that only significant relations are included.
In the next sections I present the results of the analysis.
The extent of the European consular cooperation in visa policy Table 1 show that the Schengen states in general strongly rely on cooperative arrangements for visa-issuing. On average, the European states have independent representation in 51 third countries, relies on their partners in 49, both forms in 2 and do not have a consular presence at all in 67 states. Cooperative representation is thus almost as common as having independent visa issuing facilities in a third country.
There are, however, considerable differences between the member states. Italy is somewhat isolated in the network as it only cooperates with France, and the other member states do not in general rely on its otherwise extensive consular services. Finland is excluded altogether from the picture because it only has a marginal number of ties with the other member states. In sum, in the years prior to the enlargement of Schengen the consular cooperation between the member states occurred in a stable and recurrent structure. France was at the centre of the network. Germany similarly occupied a key role, but was less central because it did not cooperate with most of the Nordic countries. Italy had a somewhat secluded role only linked with France and partially Germany. The Nordic countries -but Finland -cooperated in a distinct sub-group as did the Benelux countries. The Southern European countries, and Austria, finally clustered together.
The pattern of cooperation thus largely followed regional geographical groupings in Europe. Explaining the extent and pattern of cooperation
There is a wide range of theories of European integration (Rosamond 2000) . Three of the main contemporary approaches are realism (Waltz 1979; Hoffmann 1966; Howorth 2001; Hill 1998) , liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993; Moravcsik & Nicolaïdes 1999) and constructivism (Neumann 2002; Waever 1998; Bretherton & Vogler 2006) . In the following sections I use these three theories to develop a set of explanations of the visa cooperation abroad, and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the accounts.
A realist explanation
Realism is a key theory of international relations (Legro & Moravcsik 1999: 5) , and is often used in studies of especially European foreign policy (Howorth 2001; Hill 1998) . It is a rich and varied approach.8 My analytical starting-point is neo-realism and its picture of world politics as an international anarchy populated by sovereign states (Waltz 1979: 7; Keohane 1986: 7) . The interest of the state is in this account defined as survival (Waltz 1979) . Concerned first and foremost with securing their own continued existence the states will attempt to balance each other so that no actor becomes powerful enough to conquer the others. What determines policy is solely the overall distribution of material capabilities in the system of states -not ideologies, historical ties or domestic politics. International relations are hence highly competitive and mistrustful. Consequently, neo-realism is sceptical about the possibility of cooperation in global politics. This is especially the case for the larger and more powerful states, which are the analytical focus of the theory (Keohane 1986).
Applied to EU visa policy, this line of explanation directs our attention towards the structure and extent of cooperation between the major member states. These are European visa cooperation these member states should also be accounted for.
If we shift the focus to classical realism (Rose 1998; Rynning 2011) smaller states reappear as relevant objects of analysis. Moreover, the geopolitics of territory, population flows and frontiers become important (Waever 1992a: 172; Ashley 1987; Rudolph 2003) . States have a fixed location and their interests are therefore to a large extent driven by which countries they find themselves bordering. Thus, organised crime or social upheaval in a neighbour country is a security concern for a state as it could threaten the stability of the border area. This territorial dimension was largely absent in the neorealist model with its structuralist focus on global power relations (Buzan & Waever 2003: 11) .9
The classical, geopolitical realist explanation directs our attention to the EU states which share territorial borders with third countries. This shifts the focus to the Southern and Eastern clusters. The former have strong interests in trade and 9 Mouritzen (1997: 80) argues that geographical location is entirely absent from the neo-realist model because it was originally based on an analogy to the micro-economic concept of a market, an idea which does not involve territory. This questions the classical realist account.
Realism, in sum, is able to explain some of the central dynamics in the structure and extent of cooperation. Specifically, it provides an account of the position of the main players. Yet the key pattern in the data -regional clusters -is not adequately accounted for.
Liberal intergovernmentalism
Liberal intergovernmentalism is a central approach in European studies mainly developed by Moravcsik (1993 Moravcsik ( , 2003 . The theory models EU-politics as a two-level game (cf. Putnam 1988) . In a first round of domestic politics -primarily involving economic interest groups -the preference of a member state towards a given issue is formed. In a second stage at the EU-level the state then negotiates rationally with the other EU-members to achieve an outcome as close as possible to this interest. The international bargaining process occurs in a dense net of institutional rules and norms where the member states can make credible commitments and link diverse issues to enable more players to be accommodated (cf. Keohane 1984).
A member state thus settles on its visa policy preference in the national stage of the game. Should the overall approach be liberal or restrictive? Key actors are economic interest groups -major companies, trade organizations and the tourism industry.
Because of their interest in easy travel for tourists and business partners we would expect them to lobby for a liberal policy: extensive consular representation abroad and generous visa issuing practices. National politicians seeking re-election can also play a role at this level, Moravcsik emphasises (1993: 483f 
A constructivist approach
Constructivism is the major alternative to realist and liberal approaches within international relations and European foreign affairs studies (cf. Smith 2001). The general starting-point is the meta-theoretical claim that the world does not have meaning independently of the language we use to describe it (Campbell 1998: 4) .
From this follows that we should be analytically interested in and study the ways in which different discourses and practices give significance to and allows us to interpret actions and events (Larsen 1999: 453; cf. Neumann 2002) . Instead of merely assuming that state interests are objectively given we should focus on how construction of identities make interests meaningful and inform how they are defined (Weldes 1996; Ringmar 1996) .
The analytical ambition of constructivist approaches varies. Hansen (2006;  for a discussion see Wendt 1998) argues for the "impossibility of causality" and pleads for a sole focus on the "constitutive" effects of discourses and practices. We can thus investigate how shared constructions make events and actions meaningful, but we cannot attribute a causal role to ideas (cf. Neumann 1994). Waever (1998) pleads for a focus on "negative predictions" emphasising that discourse analysis should not be used in attempts to explain what will happen but only to map out the field of actions that would not be meaningful and hence are unlikely to occur. Jepperson, Katzenstein and Wendt (1996; see also Finnemore & Sikkink 1998) argue that "ideational" factors can and should be included in causal analysis alongside "material". Thus, for any given political situation we can investigate the independent and relative causal importance of shared beliefs in bringing about the outcome. In this paper I follow this latter causal, explanatory approach. I view discourses and practices as constitutive of shared identities. These identities, in turn, can be included as an ideational variable in causal analysis and used to explain events and actions.
The focal point for constructivist analyses of identity and international policy was initially the nation-state (Katzenstein 1996; Berger 1996; Weldes 1996; Larsen 1999; Waever 1998; Campbell 1998) . But what, from a constructivist perspective, is a nation? According to Anderson's (1991) now classical argument the nation is an "imagined community". In a complex historical analysis Anderson shows how a common linguistic space, the nation, was created through the development of new forms of mass-communication and state administrative practices and came to be experienced by its members as a community. Despite the impossibility of ever meeting more than a fraction of one's compatriots, citizens feel a sense of commonality. We thus, Anderson emphasises, distinguish members from nonmembers and are often willing to make heavy sacrifices for a community that is seen as a sovereign political entity. Another way of putting this is that national belonging is part of our identity and shapes in crucial ways how we act and interact.
As Neumann (1994: 58) points out, however, not only nations but also regions can be seen as imagined communities. This suggests that we can push this line of argument beyond the nation state (cf. Held 1998: 19; Bellamy 2004: 31f) and apply it to policy cooperation at a regional level. In all likelihood, regions are imagined as less thick (Walzer 1994) communities than the nation. Still, they could exhibit similar features.
To illustrate, let us take the case of the Nordic regional cluster.
The Nordic region is characterized by strong linguistic similarities (Waever 1992b: 95) . The Swedish, Danish and Norwegian languages are very alike, and there is a widespread assumption in the populations that it is easy to understand each other.
Finnish and Icelandic differ markedly but Swedish and Danish respectively are common second languages in these two countries. Moreover, universalistic welfare states developed in all of the countries in the same period with similar administrative practices and technologies (Miles 2010: 186) . Analyses of general societal discourses show that the Nordic countries do indeed share a perception of each other as coming from stable, small, rule-of-law welfare states (Hansen & Waever 2001) . That is, they recognize in each other a certain commonality as a basis for trust. In this way the Nordic region resembles Anderson's national imagined community, although it is thinner and does not entail as strong ideas about sovereignty or patriotism.
The Nordic case suggests that the patterns of visa cooperation can be explained as a result of 'regional imagined communities'. Shared perceptions of likeness in terms of especially language and state structures generate trust which facilitates collaboration on sensitive issues. Within the regions the member states can meaningfully share and transfer sovereignty over decisions concerning which persons should be allowed or denied entry to their territory. But can this account be generalized beyond Scandinavia or do we need another approach to understand the remaining patterns?
Let us look at the other groupings in the network one by one. The Benelux clusterwhich is strong and persistent -is characterized by linguistic diversity (Vanhoonacker 2003: 14) . The Netherlands and Belgium, however, share a colonial past and all three countries have a long history of state-building in the light of vulnerability to European warfare. The Southern group also has important similarities but many differences as well (Featherstone & Malta and Austria are the odd ones out. The Eastern cluster displays substantial linguistic diversity, but also shares a recent history of Communism, peaceful revolution and EU-accession central to the state-building of these countries (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005: 2; Hamilton 1999: 136) . All in all, the explanatory model has some purchase for the other clusters, but also limitations. It seems very likely that some forms of regional imagined communities do exist which facilitates cooperation, but that these are less tightly knit than the Nordic group.
What about France and Germany? Their consular facilities are made available to and used by almost all other EU-countries. The two states do not rely on the services of others. As centres of the network the region to which they belong is therefore Europe as such (cf. Waever 2001: 39f). In the case of France this is understandable given its recent past as colonial world power which formed the making of the French nationstate. In its own understanding France is still a global actor with a civilizing mission.
Only now this role is played out through a European Union shaped in the image of and revolving around France (Waever 1998) . In Germany the nation-state was fundamentally reconfigured after the Second World War. Its administration was rebuilt and discourses of German identity underwent significant changes. Only as a peaceful part of Europe could Germany redeem itself after the atrocities of the gas chambers. Offering assistance to smaller EU members can be seen as way of enacting this role of an institutionally embedded friendly regional power (Katzenstein 1997; Waever 1998 ). The European Union from its earliest days has been created around an idea of a French-German centre (Cole 2010) . Bureaucratic structures both within the EU and in individual member states are to large extent influenced by the traditions of these two core countries. French and German are leading administrative and diplomatic languages in the EU spoken widely in most member states, especially by officials. Taken together, this explains why so many smaller member-states avail themselves of the consulates of France and Germany.
The 'regional imagined communities' concept thus offers a very convincing explanation of Nordic cooperation and the role of EU core countries. It finds support in the remaining patterns as well. The latter, however, suggest that the account demands more commonality in language and nation-state history than can be observed.
Constructivist arguments are not solely about identity. A different strand focuses on norms (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998) . This prompts us to ask if the network structure could be the result not of imagined communities but of a looser set of institutionally embedded practices. It might be that for some reason the member states got in the habit of cooperating mainly with their neighbours and that this has gradually evolved into standard operating procedures and norms of appropriateness (March & Olsen 1989; Allison & Zelikow 1999) . AT  BE  DE  ES  FI  FR  IT  NL  PT  LU  DK NO  SE  EL  IS   AT  5  27  14  1  32  1  2  6 AT  BE  DE  ES  FI  FR  IT  NL  PT  LU  DK NO  SE  EL  IS   AT  6  27  14  1  30  1  3  6 
